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EFFECTS OF COALITION IN THE SYMMETRIC 
THREE-PERSON NON-ZERO SUM 
MATRIX GAME 
- SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTION PROCESSES 
BASED UPON THE NORMATIVE MODELS OF NEEDS 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE MARTYR SITUATION-
By 
TAKASHI TERAOKA (~fllll ~)* 
(Department of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo) 
The 6 normative models of need for coalition among players in the symmetric 3-
person non-zero sum games of the 2 X 2 X 2 type were constructed. The processes of 
response selection based on all the possible needs systems which are combinations of 3 
needs were simulated by a computer for the 13 martyr games. The main results of the 
simulation were as follows. i) It was possible to realize the mutual prosperity cell 
as the terminal state by the needs systems consisting of only the joint gains needs among 
2 players even under the PD game situation. ii) It was suggested that the PD in 3-
person games should be divided into the weak and the strong types depending on the 
logical structure of the matrix. 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of coalition constitutes generally one of the most fundamental aspects 
in the theoretical description of the structure of human relations in the n-person game 
situation. The coalition among players in the three-person game is the basic forms of 
the coalition in the n-person game. According to the traditional theories of 
coalition (for example, Caplow, 1968), it has been pointed out that any form of 
coalition may be formed when the structure of the power or the payoff condition III 
the three-person game is symmetric among the players. It seems understandable, there-
fore, that the traditional theories have placed a more accent on the complex problems 
in coalition formation where the relation among the three players is non-symmetric. 
However, some novel facts might be found even in such a simple symmetric situation 
if it is possible to assume that some hierarchical structure exists between the given 
game situation and some superordinate situation as dominating the former. 
The principal purposes of this paper are to put forward the assumption of some 
hierarchical structure between situations, and to construct the normative models of the 
needs for coalition among players in the symmetric three-person non-zero sum games 
represented by a payoff matrix of the 2 X 2 X 2 type on that assumption, and moreover, 
* Visiting professor of psychology at Tohoku University for the 1976 school year. 
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to clarify logically the structural properties based upon the coalition in the fundamental 
dilemma game called the martyr in three-person games by analyzing the selection processes 
derived from the models of needs by means of computer simulation. 
THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN SITUATIONS 
The following assumption was adopted in order to rationalize the present attempt 
to construct the models of needs for coalition and to analyze the processes of selecting 
responses derived from the models. The assumption can be expressed in the following 
four statements: i) some superordinate situation exists over the given game situation, 
ii) the form of characteristic function for the superordinate situation is generally 
disregarded for the time being, but, iii) the direction concerning the coalition among the 
three players under the given game situation is firmly controlled by that superordinate 
situation, and, iv) the form of characteristic function for the superordinate situation is 
never affected by the processes of response selection under the present game situation. 
This assumption means that each player is obliged to select his responses depending 
on the structure of the coalition already firmly determined by the superordinate situa-
tion which exists implicitly but which controls the given matrix game situation; in other 
words, the structure of coalition among three players in the present game situation is 
given independently of the structure of matrix and the processes of selecting responses 
under the game situation are rather perfectly dependent upon the already determined 
structure of coalition. This makes ours a contrasting point of departure from that of 
the traditional theories. Thus we can have the logical basis of analyses on the relations 
between the processes of response selection and the various clearly represented coalitions. 
NEEDS SYSTEM 
Let us suppose that the behavior of each player P A=(A=1,2, 3), in the three-
person game, is controlled by two fundamental motives which specify the criterion of 
selecting responses, that is, the associative motives and the purposive motives. The 
associative motives concern the size of association which means the form of coalition 
among players in the traditional term. These are further divided into three submotives, 
viz., the individual motive, the coalition motive and the solidarity motive as shown in 
Table 1. The purposive motives concern the so-called social motivations or the purpose 
of selecting responses. These are further divided into two submotives, viz., the score 
motive and the difference motive. 
The player with the individual motive as one of associative motives IS never 
inclined to form any association. The player P A with the coalition motive is inclined to 
choose either of the players, PA, and PA" as his partner, though the player's one-sided 
choice of the partner does not always mean that the real coalition is formed between the 
two players. The player with the solidarity motive is inclined to choose both the other 
two players as his partners. The player with the score motive as one of purposive motives 
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Table 1. Needs as combinations of the associative motives 
and the purposive motives. 
Purposive motives 
Associative motives 
Score motive Difference motive 
Individual profit need Single domination need 
Individual motive 
M..t(..t;S) ~ MA (..t;D) c, 
Joint gains need Expulsive clique need 
Coalition motive Md..t • ..t';S) MA(..t,..t';D) 
MA (..t,..t";S) 
---
MA(..t,..t";D) 0-
Common property need Entire equalization need 
Solidarity motive MA (..t,..t',..t";S) MA(..t,..t',..t";D) 
~ --0--
[ Inn] nnn 
[ I I nJ n I n [ I n I ] nn I 
+ 
+ 
Fig. 1. Individual profit need. 
134 T. T era 0 k a 
is inclined to make the total gains of his own association as large as possible, and the 
player with the difference motive is inclined to make the difference between the score 
level of his own association and the score level of the other group or player as large as 
possible. 
Is this YES 
trial the last >-"""'------, 
one? 
Fig. 2. Single domination need. 
Next, let us assume that the combination of an associative motive and a purposive 
motive constructs a need. For examples, the combination of the individal motive and 
the difference motive constructs the single domination need and the combination of the 
coalition motive and the score motive the joint gains need. Each need in each player 
specifies the concrete criterion in selecting responses along the sequence of trials under 
the given game situation. Thus a total of six needs obtain as the normative models, but 
each player can have one among the possible eight needs because the two needs based on 
the coalition motive, the joint gains need and the expulsive clique need, are divided into 
two sorts, respectively. 
The algorithms of selections based upon these needs were shown in Fig. I-Fig. 6. 
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In drawing these figures, a few additional criterions were introduced. Anyway each 
player can choose a need from among the eight ones independently of the other two 
players. Therefore, the number of all the possible combinations in the eight needs 
among three players is 104 as shown in Table 2. The arrows in the figure indicate the 
direction in the player's associative motive. The combination of the three needs 
among the three players is called the needs system. 
Fig. 3. Joint gains need. 
THE MARTYR IN THREE-PERSON GAMES 
The game used in the present study is called the martyr with four score levels in three-
person games. Teraoka (1978) has divided the symmetric three-person non-zero sum 
matrix games into four main classes both with regards to the fixed and the non-fixed 
types and with regards to the standard and the degenerative types. According to his 
classification, the above martyr game belongs to a group of the games of the fixed 
degenerative type because the number of maximum possible score levels is six in the 
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games of the standard type. Accordingly, the game used in the present paper might 
be, in a sense, the martyr of a special form. However, the inspection of the game of 
this type would be rather useful for comparing it with the martyr in two-person games 
and for analyzing the essential characteristics of martyr games, because the number of 
martyr games is only one in the three-person games with four score levels as shown 
in Table 3b in contrast to the ten types in the standard games with six score levels. 
Fig. 4. Expulsive clique need. 
When some needs system containing the joint gains need or the common property 
need is formed under a game situation, the selection processes of the players depends on 
the sum of scores of the two or three players or on the difference between the sum of 
scores of the two players and that of the remaining player in a cell of the payoff matrix. 
Therefore, the various payoff matrices represented by the actual scores of some specific 
values, not by score levels, should be treated as the objects for analyses, even though the 
matrix represented by the score levels in this paper is only one. As shown in Table 4, 
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we can prepare a set of thirteen matrices (TOI-T13) possessing as a whole all the 
possible essential structures in the martyr with four score levels. All of these matrices 
were used for the following simulation. 
Fig. 5. Common property need. 
RESULTS OF COMPUTER SIMULATION 
Table 5 shows the terminal states in the processes of selecting responses for each of 
the thirteen matrix games based upon the 104 needs systems. These were the results 
simulated by a computer*. The thirteen matrices are ultimately classified into five 
groups as shown in Table 5, viz. Group I (TOI-T02), IGroup II (T03), Group III (T04--
T05), Group IV (T06-T12) and Group V (T13). The perfectly same results were 
obtained for the matrix games contained in a group. This classification is based upon 
the form of absorption and circulation in the terminal states. The absorption is divided 
* The computer, FACOM 630-75, in Hokkaido University Computing Center was used for this 
simulation research. 
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into four cases, viz., the case of absorption into the cell {I I I} (sign S in the table), the 
cells {II II III} (S'), {I I II} (D) and {I II II} (D'). The cells {I I I} and {II II II} mean 
(B B B) and (0 0 0), respectively, where these cells are indicated by the levels of score. 
The cell {I I II} as a category in the raw or the column on this table contains really the 
cases {I I II}, {I II I} or {II I I} as the initial or terminal states. Anyway the signs S, 
S', D and D' in the table mean the respective forms of absorption in the terminal 
states. Sign On means a circulation among n cells. 
Is this Y ES 
trial the la st ;>- -----, 
one? 
[ ]] II ] [] II] ] 11]11 1111] 
+ 
(w+z) 
-(x+ y ) 
+ 
Fig. 6. Entire equalization need. 
Table 6 shows various total numbers concerning the terminal states for the thirteen 
matriX games on the basis of the 104 needs systems. The numbers in the table mean the 
frequencies of the needs systems. Notice that the number of absorption into the cell 
{II II II} is fairly larger for the processes in the two matrix games contained in the 
Group I, T01 and T02, than for the processes in the other matrix games. 
Next, let us focus on the results for the so-called prisoner's dilemma games as a special 
case of the martyr among three-person games. These prisoner's dilemma games are TOl, 
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Table 2. All the possible needs systems as combinations 
of three needs among the players. 
6 6 A • • c c c c c c • / 
A 1\ 1 /\ /\ / 1 1\ /\ 6 A6 6 .~ .. ~. c~c o~o .~ .. ~. . ..,..-. • • c---'c A A6 COOl C002 C003 C004 coos C006 C007 C008 C009 COlO COll C012 CO 13 
• / j • • 0 0 • • 0 • /\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ / / / c / j • \ O~D c..--c 
C015 
o 0 .~. O~O .~. O~O.. ... .. A 66 6A 
C014 C016 C017 C018 e019 C020 C021 C022 C023 C024 
c • 0 • 0 • 0 A A A 
\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ / 1\ 
6.. A A A 6 6 6 6 A 6 & 6 .~ • • ;e=>.. • 
c 
/ 
A 6& 
C027 C028 C029 C030 C031 C032 C033 C034 C035 C036 C037 
6 A A A 6 6 6 A A A A 
C025 
Do 
/ 
. ~. 
C038 
Do 
e026 
Do 
.~ . 
/\ / /\ / 1\ / \ 1\ 
• • 0...-0 o~o a 0 O~O O~D 0 0 .-.;---0 .~D .~o. 0 .~O 
/ 
C040 C041 C042 C043 C044 C045 C046 C047 C048 C049 COSO C051 C052 
Do Do • • • 000 • • .00 
1\ 1\ /\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ /\ 1\ /\ /\ 
.~a a 0 .~ •• ~.. • .~ •• ~.. • D...-O o~o 0 0 O~O o~o 
C053 C054 C055 C056 C057 C058 C059 C060 C061 C062 C063 C064 C065 
o •••• 0 0 0 0 A 6 A 6 
1\ 1\ 1\ /\ 1\ 1\ /\ /\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 
o 0 O~O O---!>o.O o~o 0 0 .-.;--0 .~o .~o. 0 .~ •• ~. o~o o~o 
C066 C067 C068 C069 C070 C071 C072 C073 C074 C075 C076 C077 C078 
A . c • c •• c c A A A 
~ ~ 1\ 1\ 1\ /\ 1\ 1\ /\ 1\ 1\ \ 1\ .~o .~o .~ •• ~. o~o o~o .~o .~o .~o .~o .~ •• ~ •• ~O 
C079 C080 C081 C082 C083 C084 C085 C086 C087 C088 C089 C090 C091 
A A A A .. Do A A A A A A A 
\ 1\ \ 1\ \ 1\ \ 1\ \ 1\ \ /\ \ 
.~o a~. o~. 0 __ 0 o~o .~ •• ~ • • ...-0 .~o D~. o~. O~O o~o 
C092 C093 C094 C095 C096 C097 C098 C099 Cl00 Cl0l Cl02 Cl03 el04 
Pi 
I 
II 
Table 3. Payoff matrix with a general form in the 
three-person non-zero sum games and the 
matrix of martyr game of a degenerative 
type used in the analysis. 
(a) (b) 
P 2 P s 
P s 
I II I II 
I uuu wyw BBB DAD 
II wwy zxx DDA DAA 
I yww xxz ADD AAD 
II = vvv ADA 000 
w=z and y=x A>B>O>D 
T02 and T05 and they belong to either Group I or Group III. It was found already in 
Table 5 and 6 that the number of the needs systems introducing the response selection 
into the so-called mutual prosperity cell {I I I} as the terminal cell is four in the Group I 
and six in the Group III. These six needs systems were C005, C006, C017, C018, 
C019 and C020 as easily grasped from the results in Table 5. Notice that the four 
common needs systems consist of only needs based on the solidarity motives among the 
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Table 4. Possible matrices of the martry game with four levels. 
TOI T02 T03 T04 I T05 
2B>A+D>2C -I 2C>A+D 2C=A+D 3C>A+2D 3C=A+2D I 3C<A+2D 
444 050 333 040 333 050 2 2 2 0 3 0 
I 
333 040 
005 055 004 044 005 055 0 0 3 0 3 3 004 044 
500 550 400 440 500 550 3 0 0 3 3 0 400 440 
50 5 333 404 222 505 222 3 0 3 1 1 1 I 404 111 
T06 T07 T08 
I 
T09 
I 
TIO 
2B=A+D 2B=A+D 2B=A+D 2B<A+D 2B<A+D I 
3C>A+2D 3C=A+2D 3C<A+2D I 3C>A+2D 3C=A+2D I I 
444 080 333 060 222 040 I 55 5 o 11 0 I 444 
090 
008 088 006 066 004 044 
I 
0011 o 1111 009 099 
800 880 600 660 400 440 11 0 0 1111 0 
I 
900 990 
808 033 606 222 404 11 1 11011 444 909 333 
TIl T12 T13 
2B<A+D 3B=A+2D>3C 3B<A+2D 3B>A+2D>3C 
I 222 050 222 06 0 222 070 
005 055 006 066 007 077 
500 550 6 00 660 700 770 
505 111 6 06 111 707 1 1 1 
three players as shown in Table 2. In other words, even the needs systems consisting of 
only the joint gains needs among three players, 0005 and 0006, can lead into {I I I} in 
the prisoner's dilemma with the structure of the matrix T05. Moreover, these results 
emphasize that the needs systems containing one or more needs based upon the individual 
motive can never lead into {I I I} as the terminal state in any martyr game. 
However, these results were essentially based on the algorithms of the need models 
as shown in the Figures. The mechanisms of choices based on these need models 
contains such additional criterions as the following: namely, i) at the first trial, the player 
tries to choose the cell among the eight cells in the matrix matching optimally to his 
present need independently of the intentions of the other two players, ii) when it is 
difficult to decide between the alternatives according to the basic structure of each 
need, the player chooses it by adopting the new criterion based upon the motive 
opposite to his present motive, for example, the single domination need as opposed 
to the individual profit need, and, iii) the selection of alternative in the next trial for 
a player is always based on the assumption that the other two players would not 
change the alternatives which they has already chosen at the present trial. 
A set of these assumptions is introduced as a primary approximation for the 
mechanism of choices under game situations. If the initial choices among the players 
are different from the ones based on these models, it is supposed at least that the form 
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Table 5. Terminal states of selection processes for the thirteen matrices 
of the martyr game with four levels. * 
Needs 
system I 
Group of matrices III 
I I II ImjIvl V I Needs system I Group of matricas I I II I III I IV I V 
001 S' 
I 
S' s' S' S' 053 S' D' D' D' 
002 S' S' S' S' S' OM S' D' D' D' 
003 S' 
I 
s' s' S' S' 055 D' S D' D' 
004 S' S' S' S' s' 
I 
056 D' S D' D' 
005 S' S S C2 C2 057 D' S D' D' 
006 S' S S C2 C2 058 S' C3 C3 C3 
007 S' S' S' S' S' 059 S' C3 C3 C3 
008 S' S' S' S' S' 060 S' C3 C3 C3 
009 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 061 D' D' D' D' 
010 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 062 D' D' D' D' 
011 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 063 D' D' D' D' 
012 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 064 S' S' S' S' 
013 S' I D' D' D' D' 065 S' S' S' S' 014 S' D' D' D' D' 066 S' S, S' S' 
015 S' D' D' D' D' 067 D' C2 D' C2 
016 S' D' D' D' D' 068 D' C2 D' C2 
017 S S S S C2 069 D' C2 D' C2 
018 S S S S S 070 D' C2 D' C2 
019 S C3 S C3 C3 071 S' D' D' D' 
020 S D' S D' D' 072 S' D' D' D' 
021 S' D' D' D' D' 073 S' D' D' D' 
022 S' D' D' D' D' 074 S' D' D' D' 
023 S' D' D' D' D' 075 D C2 C2 C2 
024 S' D' D' D' D' 076 D C2 C2 C2 
025 S' D' D' D' D' 077 S' S' S' S' 
026 S' D' D' D' D' 078 S' S' S' S' 
027 S' S' 
I 
S' S' S' 079 D' D' D' D' 
028 S' S' S' S' S' 080 D' D' D' D' 
029 i D' D' D' D' D' 081 D S D' C3 030 
I 
S' s' S' S' S' 082 D C2 C2 C2 
031 D' D' D' D' D' 083 S' D' D' D' 
032 I S' S' S' S' S' 084 S' S' S' S' 
033 D' D' D' D' D' 085 D' C3 D' C3 
034 S' S' S' S' S' 086 D' C3 D' C3 
035 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 087 D' C3 D' D' 
036 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 088 D' D' D' D' 
037 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 089 D' C2 D' C2 
038 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 090 D' C2 D' C2 
039 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 091 S' D' D' D' 
040 S' C2 C2 C2 C2 092 S' D' D' D' 
041 S' S' S' S' S' 093 D' D' D' D' 
042 S' S' S' S' S' 094 D' D' D' D' 
043 S' S' S' S' S' 095 S' S' S' S' 
044 S' S' S' S' S' 096 S' S' S' S' 
045 S' S' s' 
f 
s' S' 097 D' C2 D' C2 
046 S' S' S' S' s' 
II 
098 D' C2 D' C2 
047 S' D' D' D' D' 099 I S' D' D' D' 
048 S' D' D' D' D' 100 S' D' D' D' 
049 i S' D' D' I D' D' 101 D' D' D' D' 
I 
I 
050 
I 
S' D' D' I D' D' 
I 
102 D' D' D' 
I 
D' 
051 S' D' D' 
I 
D' D' 103 S' S' S' S' 
052 S' D' D' D' D' 104 S' S' S' s' I 
* Group I means the set of matrices TOI-T02. Group II contains only T03, 
Group III T04--T05, Group IV T06--T12 and Group V only T13. S means 
the cell {I I I} in the matrix. S', D and D' means {II II, II}, {I I II}, and 
{I II II}, respectively. Cn means a circulation among n cells. 
D' 
D' 
C2 
C2 
C2 
C3 
C3 
C3 
D' 
D' 
D' 
S' 
S' 
S' 
C2 
C2 
C2 
C2 
D' 
D' 
D' 
D' 
C2 
C2 
S' 
S' 
D' 
D' 
C2 
C2 
D' 
S' 
C3 
C3 
D' 
D' 
C2 
C2 
D' 
D' 
D' 
D' 
S' 
S' 
C2 
C2 
D' 
D' 
D' 
D' 
S' 
S' 
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Table 6. The distribution of absorption and circulation in the selection processes 
for the thriteen matrices of the martyr game with four levels. 
Absorption I Circulation 
Initial choice 
--------------~--------------~----
Cell I Trial I Total I Length I Trial ITotal 
(I I I) .. (II II II) 1 2 3 4 I 2 3 1 2 
(TOI-T02) 
{I I I} 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
{I I II} 14 0 0 6 4 0 3 5 2 10 3 1 4 0 4 
{I II II} 42 0 0 21 21 21 21 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 
(II II II) 44 0 0 0 44 44 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 104 4 0 27 69 69 24 5 2 100 3 1 4 0 4 
---
(T03) I 
(I I I) 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
(I I II) 5 0 0 2 3 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
(I II II) 28 0 0 10 12 0 12 10 0 22 0 6 6 0 6 
(II II II) 70 7 0 28 14 14 35 0 0 49 21 0 21 0 21 
------~ 
Total 104 8 0 40 29 15 52 10 0 77 21 6 27 0 27 
(T04-T05) 
(I I I) 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
(I I II) 14 0 0 8 3 0 7 4 0 11 3 0 3 0 3 
(I II II) 42 0 0 29 10 21 10 8 0 39 0 3 3 0 3 
}II II II} 44 2 0 18 14 14 20 0 0 34 10 0 10 0 10 
----_._ .... -
Total 104 6 0 55 27 39 37 12 0 88 13 3 16 0 16 
(T06-T12) I {I I I} 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 (I I II) 5 0 0 2 3 0 4 1 0 
I 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
(I II II) 28 0 0 12 10 0 10 12 0 22 0 6 6 0 6 
{II II II} 70 1 0 31 14 14 29 3 0 
\ 
46 23 1 24 0 24 
------
Total 104 2 0 45 27 15 43 16 0 74 23 7 30 0 30 
(T13) 
{I I I} 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
(I I II) 5 0 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
(I II II) 28 0 0 12 10 0 10 12 0 22 0 6 6 0 6 
(II II II) 70 0 0 28 14 14 28 0 0 42 28 0 28 0 28 
-------
--
Total 104 1 0 42 27 15 41 14 0 70 28 6 34 0 34 
in the terminal states might also be different from the results as shown in Table 5 and 6. 
Now, let us concentrate on the results for the games with the prisoner's dilemma type 
among three players, which were T01, T02 and T05, because it seems that the games of 
this type have the structure of the most important dilemma in the martyr games. 
The number of all possible states of the initial choices in a matrix game is eight. 
The structures of the terminal states in the above three games were inspected 
thoroughly in everyone of the eight states of initial choices and in everyone of the 104 
needs systems by the computer simulation. From this analysis, it was clarified that the 
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16 needs systems as shown in Table 7 have possibilities to lead into {I I I}, provided that 
the cell of the initial choices is adequate. In Table 7, Type A means that {I I I} is 
realized as the terminal cell when the initial cell is {I I I} or {II II II}. When the 
initial cell is either {I I II} or {I II II}, {I II II} is always realized as the terminal cell 
for all 16 needs systems. Both Type B and Type C mean that the {I I I} is realized 
as the terminal cell only when the initial cell is {I I I}. When {I I I} is not realized as 
the initial cell, the terminal cell is always {I II II} in Type B and {II II II} in Type C. 
In Table 7, the number of A is larger in the Group III and the number of C larger in 
the Group I. Therefore, it seems that the matrices contained in Group I, T01 and T02, 
represent 'harsher' dilemma situations than the matrix in Group III, T05, as to the 
realization of {I I I} as the terminal state. In other words, the prisoner's dilemma in 
three-person games, which has the structure of 3B>2A+D as to the score levels, is 
at least divided into two types, viz., the weak and the strong types, depending on the 
logical structure. The conditions of the weak and the strong types in the prisoner's 
dilemma are that 3C~A+2D for the former and 2C~A+D for the latter on the matrix 
of Table 3b. 
Table 7. Sixteen needs systems in which {I I I} is possible to appear as th terminal 
stage for the prisoner's dilemma in the three-person games.* 
Needs system 1 5 1 6 117 1 18 1 19 I 20 I 55 I 56 1 57 1 58 1 59 I 60 81 83 85 
TOI & T02 I C Ic-~I c 1=1 B 1 ~ I ~ I B 1 c I c I c B C B T04 & T05 A A'A C B A B B B A B B I • 
1 86 
1= 
* A, Band C are the names of type. For example, Type A means that {I I I} is realized 
as the terminal cell when the initial cell is {I I I} or {II II II}. 
Next, let us take a glance at the relation between the needs systems and the 
strong or weak structures of these matrices. From the results shown in Table 7, it is 
pointed out that the two needs systems with three joint gains needs, C005 and C006, 
have a potential power to realize the cell {I I I} as the terminal state even when the 
players drop down into {II II II}, at least, for the matrix T05 of the weak type. On 
the other hand, any needs systems containing even one entire equalization need has no 
potentiality such as mentioned above when the players drop down into {II II II}. 
Though these results, of course, would depend upon the sorts of models, it seems that 
some interesting suggestions concerning the social motivation or the association among 
persons are contained in the results. 
CONCLUSION 
The first purpose of the present study was to construct the normative models of 
the needs for association among the players in the symmetric threeperson non-zero sum 
matrix games of the 2 X 2 X 2 type. The second purpose was to clarify the structural 
properties of the martyr game, particularly the prisoner's dilemma in the three-person 
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games, based upon the above needs models by computer simulation research. The main 
results of some importance in the simulation research were as follows. i) As long as the 
cell of the initial choices among the three players happen to be adequate, the mutual 
prosperity cell {I I I} can be realized as the terminal state in the processes of selecting 
responses under the prisoner's dilemma situation by the needs systems constituting 
of only the joint gains needs among two players even though they are not based upon 
any solidarity motives. ii) It was suggested that the prisoner's dilemma in three-
person games could be divided into several types, but as long as the need models 
presented in this paper were concerned, two types, viz., the weak and the strong types, 
were found. Generally, both the structure of the score levels in the payoff matrices and 
the form of needs models would determine the type. 
These results may have some limitation because these were based on the simple 
models of needs as a primary approximation. However, some further such analyses 
would provide the frame for analyses of the processes of responses selected by real 
human subjects and would provide the ground for grasping logically the structural 
properties in the space of game situations. 
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